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slamic modernism seeks to rethink Islamic norms, rein-
terpret foundational Islamic texts, and reform particular 
Muslim institutions in ways that aim to align them more 
closely with both the spirit of Islam and current needs and 
sensibilities of society. The underlying assumption of much 
modernist discourse in Pakistan—as with modernist initia-
tives in colonial India and other colonial and post-colonial 
Muslim societies—is that true Islam is eminently suited to 
changing times, and that it is not Islam itself but rather cen-
turies of errant beliefs and practices carrying the name of 
Islam that have caused the decline of the Muslim world. In 
this view, Islam contains powerful ethical ideals that once 
served as the panacea for peoples’ ills and could do so once 
again, provided these ideals are rescued from the excessively 
formalistic understanding and application of the shari‘a into 
which they have been entombed. 
The modernists who spearheaded the movement for a 
separate Muslim homeland in the Indian subcontinent had 
aspirations of seeing these Islamic ethical ideals embodied 
in the new state. It was a state that had come into existence 
on an explicitly religious rather than ethnic, linguistic, or 
geographic basis—the first such state in modern Muslim 
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other way. Quite apart from questions of strategy, however, 
there is also an authoritarian streak in modernism itself, the 
implications of which have sometimes been clearer to their 
opponents than they have to the modernists. 
The Early Years
In an uncomplimentary piece on the guerilla warfare then 
taking place in Kashmir, the American magazine Life had 
observed in January 1948 that Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the 
founding father of Pakistan, “still had no real national 
program…except the incitation of fanatic Moslem zeal.”1 
Despite the prominence of Islam in his pre-partition dis-
course, “fanaticism,” however, was far from Jinnah’s temper-
ament. When necessary, he tried to reassure his audiences on 
that score. In a broadcast to the American people in February 
1948, shortly before his death, Jinnah noted that “Pakistan is 
not going to be a theocratic State, that is, rule of or by priests 
with divine mission. We have many non-Muslims such as 
Hindus, Christians, Parsis. But they are all Pakistanis and 
equal citizens with equal rights and privileges and every 
right to play their part in the a≠airs of Pakistan national 
state.”2 On other occasions, however, he continued to a∞rm 
his Islamic commitments. For instance, addressing the 
1 Life, January 5, 1948; reprinted in Z. H. Zaidi et al., ed. Quaid-
i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah Papers (Islamabad: Quaid-i-Azam 
Papers Project, 1993–2009), 7:68. 
2 Id. at 7:116. 
history—and it sought to serve as the center of gravity for 
Islam not only in South Asia, but the Muslim world at large. 
In hindsight, blurred as it is by the state’s chronic politi-
cal instability and eventually its dismemberment in 1971, it 
is easy to miss the excitement that the creation of Pakistan 
had created among many of its citizens. This excitement 
did nothing to alleviate the severe problems that the coun-
try faced in its early and subsequent years. But it would be 
di∞cult to make sense of some of the grandiose rhetoric of 
Pakistan’s early years without recalling the euphoria that had 
accompanied its birth. 
My purpose is to do more than document some themes 
in Pakistani modernist discourse and the light they shed on 
modernist conceptions of the shari‘a and political ethics—
that is, conceptions of the good as they relate to the pub-
lic and political spheres. It is also to bring out some of the 
ambiguities and contradictions that have both accompanied 
and enervated modernist thought. Many of these have had 
to do with the fact that, while the modernists have sought 
to foreground their ethical commitments and to shape the 
world around them in their terms, they have also often found 
themselves mired in alliances with the country’s authoritar-
ian rulers. These alliances are partly explained by the desire 
to bring about change in a hurry, from the top down, and 
partly by a recognition that the authoritarianism of the tra-
ditionalist ‘ulama and Islamists cannot be combated in any 
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level best to preserve the great ideals and the glorious traditions 
of Islam, to fight for the equality of mankind, the achievement 
of man’s legitimate rights, and the establishment of democracy? 4
Jinnah’s modernist successors continued to articulate 
their Islamic sensibilities with much fervor, but again with 
some very particular assumptions about what that entailed. 
One of the most striking expressions of such sensibilities 
was a resolution, moved in the Constituent Assembly in 
March 1949 by Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951), the country’s 
first prime minister, outlining the objectives of the constitu-
tion that was then being framed. The so-called Objectives 
Resolution began by declaring that “sovereignty over the 
entire universe belongs to God Almighty alone and the 
authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan 
through its people for being exercised within the limits pre-
scribed by Him is a sacred trust.” It went on to a∞rm the 
“principles of democracy, freedom, equality, tolerance and 
social justice, as enunciated by Islam,” and assured funda-
mental rights to all its citizens, including the minorities. At 
the same time, the resolution declared that Muslims were to 
“be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective 
spheres in accord with the teachings and requirements of 
Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and the Sunna.”5 
4 Id. at 11:429. 
5 Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates (Karachi: Manager of 
Publications, Government of Pakistan, 1947–54), 5:1–2. 
Karachi Bar Association in January 1948, he had castigated 
those “who deliberately wanted to create mischief and made 
propaganda that the Constitution of Pakistan would not be 
made on the basis of Shari‘at.”3 
What Jinnah seems to have meant by the shari‘a was what 
the British in India had meant by it, namely the Muslim 
laws of personal status governing matters such as marriage, 
divorce, and inheritance. For all the political compromises 
Jinnah might have been willing to make in defining the scope 
of their application, such laws were an expression of Muslim 
identity and setting them aside in the new state was out of 
the question. There is little to suggest, however, that he envi-
sioned—as the Islamists and many of the traditionally-ed-
ucated religious scholars, the ‘ulama, did—any expansive 
corpus of Islamic law that the state was meant to implement. 
Rather, Jinnah believed that Islam had a pronounced ethical 
dimension to it, and it was these ethical precepts that would 
guide the new state. As he stated in a message in 1945 com-
memorating the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad: 
Islam came in the world to establish democracy, peace and justice, 
and to safeguard the rights of the oppressed. It brought to human-
ity the message of equality and universal brotherhood—the equal-
ity of the rich and the poor, of the high and the low. The holy 
Prophet fought for these ideals for the major part of his life. Is it not, 
therefore, the duty of every Muslim, wherever he may be, to do his 
3 Id. at 7:57–58. Shari‘at is the Urdu for the Arabic word shari‘a.
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it is anchored in ethical, rather than legalistic, norms, which 
are best derived from the Islamic foundational texts. If it 
is not the Islam of the secularists, it is even less that of the 
traditionally-educated religious scholars (‘ulama) or that of 
the Islamists. For all the barely concealed disagreements of 
their own, the ‘ulama had wanted to reserve a role for them-
selves in determining that no legislation was “repugnant” to 
the teachings of the Islamic foundational texts. The consti-
tution that was finally put into force in Pakistan in March 
1956 gave the ‘ulama no such role. It had significant Islamic 
content, but it was almost entirely in accord with modernist 
sensibilities. 
Pakistan’s first constitution was not destined, however, 
to have much time to put down its roots. One unstable gov-
ernment followed another, and the country’s bureaucracy 
and military soon lost patience with the politicians. Martial 
law was declared in October 1958, with General Ayub Khan 
(1907–1974) as the de facto ruler and soon the president of 
the country. 
Modernism in the Ayub Khan Era 
In his view of Islam, Ayub Khan shared much with the mod-
ernist politicians he had replaced. As he told the ‘ulama in a 
speech in May 1959 at a prominent madrasa, Islam is a “pro-
gressive religion” but a great distance had come to separate 
religion and life. In good modernist fashion, he chastised 
the ‘ulama for reducing Islam to a set of dogmatic beliefs 
It is easy to remark on elements of incoherence in the 
Objectives Resolution.6 God and the state of Pakistan are 
both sovereign, but precisely what that entails is not spelled 
out. There is a commitment to liberal and democratic val-
ues, but how they are to be inflected by Islam and what that 
would mean for non-Muslims remains unstated. There is 
also some tension between the a∞rmation of freedom, tol-
erance and fundamental rights for all, on the one hand, and 
the state’s envisioned role of enabling people to lead good 
Muslim lives, on the other. 
Yet modernist supporters of this resolution were not 
much troubled by such tensions. To them, recognizing the 
sovereignty of God did not mean, as Islamists in Pakistan 
and elsewhere would have it, that submission to any but 
divinely ordained laws was idolatry. It meant simply that 
the business of government would be guided by ethical con-
siderations of which religion, and specifically Islam, was 
the fountainhead. Insofar as Islam embodied ethical values 
that the entire world could relate to, enabling the country’s 
Muslim citizens to live in accordance with the dictates of 
their faith held great promise for everyone. 
Muslim modernists have seldom spoken in one voice, yet 
they are united in insisting that Islam is democratic, though 
not necessarily according to Western specifications, and that 
6 Leonard Binder, Religion and Politics in Pakistan (Berkeley:  
University of California Press, 1963), 142–54.
[ 10 ] [ 11 ]
hadith—the reports about his teachings and practice and a 
source of Islamic legal norms second only to the Qur’an—
does not for the most part go back to him but reflects rather 
the evolving views of the early community. Unlike many 
Western scholars, however, he did not see hadith merely 
as pious forgery—statements attributed to the Prophet 
by subsequent generations of Muslims in pursuit of their 
particular ends. Instead, he argued that the early commu-
nity had come to model itself on the practice of the Prophet 
while continuing to elaborate on and to develop its under-
standing of this practice in light of changing circumstances. 
Reclaiming Islam’s original dynamism required that con-
temporary Muslims liberate themselves from servitude to 
any fixed understanding of the Prophet’s normative exam-
ple and instead seek guidance in the principles discernible 
behind it. Even the Qur’an, for all its preeminent authority, 
was not necessarily binding in all its particulars.8 
Rahman was not squeamish about aligning his schol-
arly views with policies of the Ayub Khan administration. 
In a series of articles he wrote on the “ideology of Islam” at 
the president’s invitation, Rahman called for close regula-
tion of the religious sphere, suggesting, for instance, that 
imams and preachers should be recruited to provide “moral 
backing” to the administration at local levels.9 His statist 
8 Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Methodology in History (Karachi: Central 
Institute of Islamic Research, 1965). 
9 Fazlur Rahman, “Some Reflections on the Reconstruction of 
and practices, presenting it as the enemy of progress, and 
“impos[ing] on twentieth century man the condition that 
he must go back several centuries in order to prove his bona 
fides as a true Muslim.”7 Rather than being stuck in sectar-
ian squabbles, Khan proclaimed, the ‘ulama needed to help 
bring people together on the basis of shared beliefs while 
learning to speak to them across educational and occupa-
tional divides. 
No one among the intellectuals represented Islamic 
modernism better during Ayub Khan’s rule than Fazlur 
Rahman (1919–1988). The son of a traditionalist, madra-
sa-educated scholar, Rahman had earned a D.Phil. from 
Oxford in 1949 where he wrote a dissertation on the great 
11th century Muslim philosopher Avicenna. He taught for 
some years at the University of Durham in England and 
then at the Institute of Islamic Studies at McGill University 
before returning to Pakistan. There he was appointed as the 
director of the Institute of Islamic Research, which the con-
stitution had mandated to help with “the reconstruction of 
Muslim society” along modernist lines. Rahman did not lose 
any time getting down to work. 
In a study that began to be serialized in the Institute’s 
journal from its very first issue, Rahman argued that much 
of what has been attributed to the Prophet in the form of 
7 Speeches and Statements by Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 
President of Pakistan, vol. 1, October 1958–June 1959 (Karachi: 
Pakistan Publications, n.d.), 110–14. 
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army. For the general (in Aristotle’s concept) is not a sol-
dier among other soldiers—just as God is not an extra-fact 
among facts—but represents ‘order,’ i.e. the fundamental 
function of holding the army together.”12 
In 1966, Fazlur Rahman published Islam, a broad-rang-
ing survey of key facets of Islam from a distinctly modern-
ist perspective. Before long, the book became part of public 
debate in Pakistan, and the chapter on the Qur’an gave to 
the ‘ulama what they had been looking for. In it, Rahman 
argued for the agency of the Prophet in the making of the 
Qur’an—a view that goes against the orthodox insistence 
that Muhammad was simply the deliverer of a divine reve-
lation that was altogether external to him. Rahman’s critics 
saw his book as an attack on the timeless universality of the 
Qur’an and the non-negotiable authority of its norms. Soon 
Rahman’s position as the director of the Institute of Islamic 
Research no longer appeared tenable and he resigned from 
it in September 1968. Facing growing opposition across the 
country, the president noted helplessly in his diary that day: 
“…it is quite clear that any form of research on Islam which 
inevitably leads to new interpretations has no chance of 
acceptance in this priest-ridden and ignorant society. What 
12 Fazlur Rahman, “The Qur’anic Concept of God, the Universe 
and Man,” Islamic Studies 6/1 (March 1967): 1–19, at 17–18, citing 
Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge:  
Harvard University Press, 1947), 2:167. 
vision was on display in other respects as well. “Islam is a 
charter for interference in society,” Rahman wrote bluntly, 
“and this charter gives to the collective institution of society, 
i.e. the Government, the right and duty to constantly watch, 
give direction to, and actually mould the social fabric.”10 A 
Qur’anic justification was o≠ered even for press and media 
censorship: “The Qur’an…asks the Government to disallow 
the public broadcast of news which is not in the public inter-
est, and denounce[s] such practices as a mischievous license 
calculated to demoralise the people and disunite them.”11 In 
1960, General Ayub Khan had promulgated his notorious 
Press and Publications Ordinance which had drastically cur-
tailed the freedom of the press. If the government needed a 
belated endorsement of it from the Qur’an, Fazlur Rahman 
thought he could provide it. 
In keeping with his statist views, it is no surprise that 
Rahman underlines the need for a strong man at the helm. 
But some of his language is extraordinary. For instance, 
when elucidating how the Qur’an presents God, Rahman 
states: “…God’s concept is functional, i.e. God is needed not 
for what He is or may be but for what He does. It is exactly 
in this spirit that Aristotle compares God to a general of the 
Muslim Society in Pakistan,” Islamic Studies 6/2 (1967): 103–20,  
at 117–18.
10 Id. at 107. 
11 Id. at 112. 
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A good deal of the extraordinary optimism that had char-
acterized modernist circles in Pakistan’s early years had dis-
sipated by this point. Bhutto, in particular, had emerged tar-
nished from the civil war. He had other vulnerabilities, too. 
He had come to power on a platform of “Islamic socialism,” 
but Pakistani ‘ulama and Islamists had remained largely 
antagonistic towards socialism in any form. A much publi-
cized fatwa issued in 1970 that denounced the idea of Islamic 
socialism had carried more than one hundred signatures by 
the ‘ulama. Bhutto strove hard to bolster his Islamic cre-
dentials. The 1973 Constitution that Bhutto instituted was 
rich in its Islamic provisions, though these were largely in 
line with provisions from the country’s two previous consti-
tutions of 1956 and 1962. In March 1974, a meeting of the 
Islamic Conference, a pan-Islamic body with its headquar-
ters in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, was held in Lahore with much 
fanfare. Later that year, Bhutto also succumbed to strong 
pressure from religious groups to declare the Ahmadis, a 
heterodox group, as non-Muslims. A Ministry of Religious 
A≠airs was established that same year. 
Significantly, Fazlur Rahman, by then professor of Islamic 
thought at the University of Chicago, was among the peo-
ple whose advice the Bhutto government sought on Islamic 
matters. Among other things, Rahman advised Bhutto on 
the goals of the newly created Ministry of Religious A≠airs. 
It is necessary, he proposed, “to present Islam in socio-moral 
will be the future of such an Islam in the age of reason and 
science is not di∞cult to predict.”13
The Bhutto and Zia al-Haqq Years 
Ayub Khan relinquished power in March 1969 to the com-
mander-in-chief of the Pakistani military, General Yahya 
Khan (1917–1980), and in December 1970, under the new 
military administration, the very first national elections in 
the country’s history were held. By this time, there was an 
active secessionist movement in East Pakistan. The election 
results gave to the Bengali secessionist party, the Awami 
League, all the seats from East Pakistan but none from the 
West Pakistan provinces. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s Pakistan Peo-
ple’s Party won a majority of seats from West Pakistan; it 
had not even bothered to put up candidates from East Paki-
stan. Though the Awami League had more seats overall in 
the National Assembly, the military government wavered 
in handing power to it and eventually decided to launch 
a military operation against the secessionists. This led to 
a full-fledged civil war in 1971, a war with India, and the 
breakup of Pakistan. The erstwhile East Pakistan emerged as 
Bangladesh, leaving only the provinces of West Pakistan as 
Pakistan. It was against this backdrop that Bhutto assumed 
the reins of government in December 1971 and proceeded to 
frame a new constitution—the country’s third. 
13 Diaries of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan, 1966–1972, ed. 
Craig Baxter (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007), 253. 
[ 16 ] [ 17 ]
Pakistan. In broad terms, that would not be an unfair assess-
ment, but there are two caveats. First, although the ‘ulama 
and the Islamists received a good deal of state patronage 
in the Zia al-Haqq era, the civil and judicial bureaucracy 
continued to be sta≠ed by many of the same Western-
educated people who had manned these o∞ces in earlier 
decades. Moreover, despite its rhetoric of Islamization, the 
regime took measures to carefully delimit its scope. Banks 
continued to deal in financial interest, though they now 
had “interest-free” counters as well. Ayub Khan’s Muslim 
Personal Laws Ordinance of 1961—another bête noire of the 
Islamists and the ‘ulama who saw it as a contravention of 
Islamic laws relating to marriage, divorce, and inheritance—
was protected against judicial review by the Federal Shari‘at 
Court, whose mandate, ironically, was to ensure that new 
and existing laws were in conformity with the shari‘a. 
Second, it is important to recognize that modernism was 
already in retreat under Bhutto. Some of those who might 
have been important contributors to the modernist project 
had left that camp well before Bhutto came to power. There 
is perhaps no better illustration of this than the career of 
Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari (1919–1978), a much respected 
Urdu literary critic. ‘Askari had acquired some prominence 
in literary circles before the partition of the Indian subconti-
nent, and he consolidated this reputation in the years follow-
ing the establishment of Pakistan. Though critical of many 
terms and to link these socio-moral principles positively 
with the broad ideals of rational, liberal and humanitarian 
progress.” There was a “vast emotional fund” in the country, 
Rahman said, that “must be turned towards positive moral 
and social virtues of nation-building and national integra-
tion. Otherwise, this emotionalism will become riotous and 
end up as a negative and destructive force.”14
The Bhutto regime was fearful about the challenge that 
religious parties posed to its legitimacy and, in the end, 
showed little interest in any experimentation with Islamic 
modernism. Even without such experimentation, the ‘ulama 
and Islamist groups were able, with help from center-right 
opposition political parties and from Bhutto’s own misman-
agement, to launch a massive agitation against his govern-
ment in the name of establishing “the system of the Prophet.” 
The unrest in the country led, in July 1977, to a military coup 
and the imposition of martial law by General Muhammad 
Zia al-Haqq. Bhutto was hanged two years later. Zia al-Haqq 
stayed in power till 1988 and oversaw the most extensive 
e≠ort thus far to “Islamize” the society and economy. 
It is tempting to see the Zia al-Haqq years as marking 
a sharp decline in the fortunes of Islamic modernism in 
14 “Report of Professor Fazlur Rahman’s Visit to Pakistan in  
Summer 1975…” (annexure b), Ford Foundation Grant # 74–141 
(reel # 3087: Islam and Social Change), Rockefeller Archive Center, 
Sleepy Hollow, New York. I am grateful to Megan Brankley Abbas 
for drawing my attention to these archives. 
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they could properly deal with the challenge and the allure of 
these ideas.16 By extension, the goal was to alert the ‘ulama to 
certain Muslim modernist proclivities, shaped by exposure 
to the West, in order to combat them. For instance, ‘Askari 
argued that 18th and 19th century European thinkers had 
tended to separate morality from religion, basing the for-
mer not on revealed truth but rather on human nature and 
reason. Instead of thinking of morality and ethics as a facet 
of religion, religion itself had come to be reduced to them. 
Consequently, “the ‘ulama need to be on their guard when 
English-educated people praise the ethical principles of 
Islam. For these people tend to think of [all Islam,] even 
Sufism, as mere ethics.”17 
Even as the ‘ulama faced sharp polemics from the mod-
ernist camp, they were able, as the case of ‘Askari sug-
gests, to make some prized inroads into that camp. What 
this example also shows is that conservative groups have 
received unexpected help from the modernizing governing 
elite themselves in making such incursions. At the very time 
when Islamic modernism was practically a matter of state 
policy, Ayub Khan’s harsh curbs on the freedom of expres-
sion may have done more than the ‘ulama could on their 
own to draw the likes of ‘Askari towards their direction. 
16 Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari, Jadidiyyat (Rawalpindi: ‘I≠at Hasan, 
1979), 16–17; cf. Aamir R. Mufti, Enlightenment in the  
Colony (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 17–18. 
17 ‘Askari, Jadidiyyat, 59–60. 
leftists, he had similar leanings himself. Before partition, he 
had defended the demand for Pakistan on grounds that “it 
would be the first populist and socialist state in the Indian 
subcontinent. As such, it would serve the interests not just 
of the Muslims but also of the Hindu masses, since it would 
assist in uprooting capitalism…and in the establishment of 
a permanent peace and security.”15
‘Askari’s position changed during the Ayub Khan era. 
Newspaper columns and writings in literary magazines 
had been the main vehicles of ‘Askari’s expression, but they 
were no longer available during the Ayub Khan regime, 
which had imposed severe restrictions on the press. By the 
time Ayub Khan relinquished power in 1969, ‘Askari was a 
di≠erent man. Some leftist leanings remained, making him 
a staunch Bhutto loyalist. But, in other respects, ‘Askari had 
gravitated irrevocably to the camp of the ‘ulama. He spent 
his last years translating into English a major Urdu com-
mentary on the Qur’an by the founder of one of the largest 
madrasas in Pakistan. 
Around the time of the fall of the Ayub Khan regime, 
‘Askari had written a short book titled Modernism, specif-
ically for the benefit of madrasa students. His purpose in 
this treatise was to make Western thought and its special-
ized terminology intelligible to his madrasa audience so that 
15 Quoted in Aftab Ahmad, Muhammad Hasan ‘Askari, aik  
mutala‘a: Dhati khutut ki rawshani main (Lahore: Sang-i mil  
Publications, 1994), 37. 
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of suicide bombings and other terrorist acts that have put 
severe strains on the economy and society. Nearly 50,000 
people are believed to have died in terrorism-related violence 
in Pakistan between 2001 and 2013.18 
Ironically, the aftermath of 9/11 also gave the military 
regime of General Pervez Musharraf an opportunity to re- 
charge a dormant modernism. As the new government 
tried, with uncertain vigor, to confront militant Islamists 
and allied groups, it also attempted to pursue a larger mod-
ernist program. Thus, in 2002, the government was able 
to secure a new ruling on the vexed question of financial 
interest from a reconstituted Shari‘at Appellate Bench of the 
Supreme Court—the highest judicial body established in the 
Zia al-Haqq era to rule on questions relating to Islamic law. 
In 1991, the Federal Shari‘at Court had determined that all 
forms of financial interest constituted the riba prohibited 
by the Qur’an, and the Shari‘at Appellate Bench upheld that 
judgment in 1999. This ruling required the government to 
end all interest-based transactions by June 2002. 
Three years after its initial ruling, the Shari‘at Appellate 
Bench reversed its position and set the earlier rulings aside. 
It sent the case back to languish with the Federal Shari‘at 
Court and signaled a new willingness to chart a more confi-
dent modernist path. The Musharraf regime also took some 
18 Ismail Khan, “Pakistan Most Terror-hit Nation,” Dawn (Kara-
chi), February 23, 2014. 
Yet the opposition to modernism, and to modernist ethics, 
has also inhibited the ‘ulama from venturing beyond their 
longstanding concern with the ethical formation of the indi-
vidual towards any sustained engagement with social and 
political ethics. 
As a result of Bhutto’s political vulnerabilities vis-à-vis the 
‘ulama and the Islamists and of Zia al-Haqq’s Islamization 
initiative, the modernist project did not fare well under their 
administrations. While little changed in the decade following 
Zia al-Haqq, there was a determined e≠ort to imbue mod-
ernism with new life during General Pervez Musharraf ’s rule 
in Pakistan (1999–2008).
The Years of “Enlightened Moderation” 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United 
States and their aftermath have exacted an enormous price 
from Pakistan. In being forced to abruptly change course 
from a sponsor and key supporter of Afghanistan’s Taliban 
regime to an ally of the United States in the War on Terror, 
the Musharraf government faced the wrath of the country’s 
Islamist and other religio-political groups. The years fol-
lowing 9/11 saw the emergence of a neo-Taliban insurgency 
not just in Afghanistan but also in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, 
the former North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan. The 
militant groups associated with this insurgency have contin-
ued to resist military operations that have been periodically 
launched against them; they have also carried out scores 
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studies curriculum in Pakistani public schools. None of this 
would survive the fall of the Musharraf regime in 2008. 
Some of the ambiguities of this phase in Pakistani mod-
ernism are worth bringing out with reference to Javed Ahmad 
Ghamidi (b. 1951), an intellectual ally that Musharraf had 
found during his years in power. Ghamidi has argued, for 
instance, that Muslim religious scholars should not med-
dle in politics but ought, rather, to concentrate on the reli-
gious guidance of the people.20 Unlike the expansive view 
that the Islamists tend to take of the powers of the state, he 
believed that, in religious terms, the state cannot require its 
Muslim citizens to do anything more than believe in God 
and the Prophet, perform their ritual prayers, and pay the 
zakat (alms) tax.21 Ghamidi was also highly critical of Zia 
al-Haqq’s Hudood Ordinances, which he saw as contraven-
ing the shari‘a on a number of grounds. Views such as these 
could and did lend useful support to the Musharraf regime 
as it battled Islamist militants and worked, in particular, to 
revise the Hudood Ordinances. 
Yet the alignment between Ghamidi’s positions and 
the concerns of the government was far from perfect. For 
20 On this and some other facets of his thought, see Muhammad 
Khalid Masud, “Rethinking Shari‘a: Javed Ahmad Ghamidi on 
Hudud,” Die Welt des Islams 47 (2007): 356–75. Also see Sadaf  
Aziz, “Making a Sovereign State: Javed Ghamidi and ‘Enlightened 
Moderation,’” Modern Asian Studies 45 (2011): 597–629. 
21 Javed Ahmad Ghamidi, Mizan, 3rd edition (Lahore: al-Mawrid, 
2008), 490–92. 
steps towards regulating the a≠airs of the country’s numer-
ous madrasas as a way of reining in the influence of the 
‘ulama. In late 2006, the legislature amended the Hudood 
Ordinances that General Zia al-Haqq had promulgated in 
1979. The original Ordinances were an ostentatious e≠ort 
to put the country’s colonial-era criminal laws on a proper 
Islamic footing, but the 2006 Protection of Women Act nar-
rowed the scope of these Ordinances and made the remain-
ing provisions harder to enforce. 
The Musharraf regime had coined a term for its mod-
ernist initiatives. Musharraf liked to speak of “enlightened 
moderation.” “It is a two-pronged strategy,” he wrote in a 
programmatic article in the Washington Post in June 2004. 
“The first part is for the Muslim world to shun militancy and 
extremism and adopt the path of socioeconomic uplift. The 
second is for the West, and the United States in particular, 
to seek to resolve all political disputes with justice and to aid 
in the socioeconomic betterment of the deprived Muslim 
world.”19 Hearkening back to the country’s first years, there 
was once again a sense that Pakistan had a role to play both 
within the Muslim world and in facilitating better relations 
between the Muslim world and the West. There was also 
talk of making enlightened moderation a part of the social 
19 Pervez Musharraf, “A Plea for Enlightened Moderation,”  
Washington Post. June 1, 2004. 
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instance, Ghamidi believed that all forms of financial inter-
est were covered by the Qur’anic prohibition of riba, which 
was hardly a convenient view from the perspective of the 
Musharraf regime. The idea that a Muslim government can 
only impose a very small number of religious obligations 
on its citizens may have been welcomed by the government 
as an antidote to Islamist conceptions of the state, but it 
also posed an obstacle to the expansive powers any modern 
government claims for itself, not just an Islamist one. And 
though, on the issue of hudud (“hudood”), Ghamidi leaves 
the imposition of the penalties to the discretion of the state 
as a way of restricting the application of the severest punish-
ments, he does not question the principle of the continued 
applicability of hudud laws.22 This is very di≠erent from the 
approach of Fazlur Rahman, who had sought in the Ayub 
Khan era to o≠er an ethical reinterpretation of hudud by 
arguing that it is not the content and the authority of hudud 
laws that should be seen as invariant but rather their goal 
of deterring people from committing certain crimes and of 
reforming the criminals.23 
Like many other modernists, Ghamidi lacked any 
meaningful social base in the country. Even the Musharraf 
government had little compunction about ignoring him 
when doing so seemed politic. For their part, Ghamidi’s 
22 Id. at 615, 628–30. 
23 Fazlur Rahman, “The Concept of Hadd in Islamic Law,” Islamic 
Studies 4: 237–51. 
conservative views on many Islamic matters did little to 
shield him from the wrath of the militants and he was forced 
to flee to Malaysia in 2010. 
Conclusion 
Although some of the decline of Pakistani modernism can 
surely be imputed to the Islamization policies of the late 
1970s and the 1980s, which themselves were part of global 
Islamic revivalist trends during those decades, the story, as 
I have tried to suggest, is more complex. That modernist 
initiatives emanated from the governing elite or from those 
seen as allied with them, and the fact that such elites them-
selves have often had a tenuous political legitimacy, have 
both contributed much towards weakening, if not discred-
iting, those initiatives. 
But it is not just the embrace of the governing elite that 
has threatened to undermine Pakistani modernism. State 
authoritarianism has also tended to narrow the space in 
which modernists may have been able to articulate their views. 
Further, modernists themselves have often been less than 
eager to reassure those skeptical of their intentions. Their 
attitude towards the ‘ulama has often been one of undis-
guised contempt. Modernist discourses on the question of 
non-Muslim minorities—a combination of incomprehen-
sion that anyone should doubt that they would be well-
served in a state guided by Islamic norms and insinuations 
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about where their loyalties really lie—have not done much 
to reassure such minorities either. 
For all the robustness of the modernists’ ethical sensibil-
ities, some of their blind spots have contributed as much to 
modernism’s declining fortunes in Pakistan as has the deter-
mined opposition it has faced from varied fronts. Another 
point is also worth making in conclusion. With some excep-
tions, Muslim modernists have taken little serious interest 
in giving intellectual substance to their ethical concerns, 
further weakening both modernism and its ethical commit-
ments. There is, of course, a long history of ethical thought 
in Islam, both in the world of the scholars of Islamic law and 
outside it (notably in Sufism, and in philosophy and politi-
cal thought). The modernists, especially the governing elite 
among them, have largely been content, however, to equate 
their ethical concerns with all that they take to be good in the 
Western liberal tradition and to then go on to claim that it is 
in Islam that these ideals find their most complete expres-
sion.24 This approach has not satisfied the secularists any 
more than it has reassured religious minorities; and such 
rhetoric can hardly be expected to have much appeal for 
ordinary citizens if it does not address, as it seldom does, 
their day-to-day problems. It has also done little to soften 
24 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Islam in Modern History (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), 206–55. For his observations on 
the early failings of Islamic modernism in Pakistan,  
to which I am indebted here, see id. at 226, 236–37.
the longstanding opposition of the ‘ulama and the Islamists, 
who tend to view modernist ethics as an alternative to the 
shari‘a rather than a part of it. Few modernists have made 
any sustained e≠ort to show that that is not the case. All 
this has contributed to the decline of Islamic modernism in 
Pakistan, in the process also decimating the ethical sensibil-
ities so deeply intertwined with it.
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